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NOTE
ALIMONY FOR MEN-THE CHANGING LAW
PAMELA Joy' SMITH
I. INTRODUCTION
In most areas of the United States, until recently, it has been the
general practice to grant alimony to a wife obtaining a divorce or
separation.' The practice of granting alimony to the wife and not to
the husband arose out of the common law duty of the husband to
support his wife.' "Alimony," defined as the support flowing from
husband to wife, is a derivation of "alimonia," a Latin word mean-
ing sustenance and support.3 Although the word "alimony" literally
includes only support for the wife, in practice it usually also in-
cludes child support.4
Prior to 1857, the English ecclesiastical courts only granted di-
vorces which authorized a couple to live separately although they
were still bound in marriage. The wife was dependent upon her
husband for support because the law gave him control over her
property and because there were few, if any, job opportunities for
married women. 5 Since a husband had the ability to be self-
supporting, and since a wife was dependent upon her husband for
support, it followed that in the event of a divorce there was no basis
to grant an award of alimony to the husband.
Despite the fact that in America courts have always granted di-
vorces that completely dissolve the marital bonds, the English prac-
tice of granting alimony has been followed here since colonial times.
Even with the advent of the married women's property acts and
other "equal rights" laws, courts generally have refused to impose
a duty of support on the wife when there is no statutory basis for
the duty.' American courts have justified the granting of alimony
as either a method of penalizing the guilty husband or a means of
preventing the wife from becoming a charge of the state. It is also
seen as a means of easing the wife's transition from married to single
status.7
1. See P. CALLAHAN, THE LAW OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE 91 (1967).
2. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 448 (1968).
3. See P. CALLAHAN, supra note 1, at 91.
4. See id. at 92. There is a tax advantage for the paying spouse to break family support
into child support and alimony in that the latter is tax deductible. See I.R.C. § 215(a).
5. See H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 420.
6. I C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 304 (1971).
7. See H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 421-22, 442.
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Courts give paramount consideration to need and fairness when
granting alimony. The need for alimony may be due to one or more
causes: (1) the restricted earning potential of the spouse who must
provide daily child care services for the children in his or her cus-
tody; (2) one spouse's limited freedom in the role model of home-
maker during the marriage which has prevented him or her from
procuring assets or strengthening wage earning capacity; (3) any
physical or emotional disabilities that either spouse may have.' The
consideration of fairness involves moral judgments about the par-
ties, such as what each contributed in terms of behavior and oppor-
tunity or role during the marriage
In the past, many states used the husband's means and earning
ability as the yardstick to determine the amount of alimony, regard-
less of the wife's independent financial situation.'0 However, in re-
cent years the courts have taken a more realistic view when award-
ing alimony to a woman by considering the monies and capital
available to the wife from sources other than her husband." With
the growing awareness of equal rights and the changing social atti-
tudes, alimony is currently undergoing a rapid transition. The
United States Supreme Court's decision in Orr v. Orr'" clearly re-
flects this atmosphere of change.
A final divorce decree dissolving the marriage of William and
Lillian Orr was entered on February 26, 1974, directing Mr. Orr to
pay Mrs. Orr alimony of $1,240 per month.' 3 Two years later, Mrs.
Orr initiated a contempt proceeding, alleging that Mr. Orr was in
arrears in his alimony payments. Mr. Orr challenged the Alabama
alimony statutes which provide the courts the authority to award
alimony to wives without providing for a corresponding authority to
award alimony to husbands."
The trial court denied Mr. Orr's motion challenging the constitu-
tionality of Alabama's alimony statutes, and Mr. Orr appealed. The
Court of Civil Appeals held that Alabama's alimony statutes were
8. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. ROSE, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW,
CAUSES AND REMEDIES 694 (1975).
9. Id. at 695. Babcock emphasizes that American courts look to which spouse is at fault
in causing the divorce. For example, most courts will deal harshly with a male adulterer by
requiring him to pay alimony to his ex-wife. The courts seek to discourage such conduct and
thereby try to enforce the strength of the institution of marriage. However, the courts base
most awards of alimony on need and on the other spouse's ability to pay.
10. See P. CALLAHAN, supra note 1, at 93.
11. See H. CLARK, supra note 2, at 444.
12. 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
13. 351 So. 2d 904, 906-07 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. quashed as improvidently granted, 351
So. 2d 906 (Ala. 1977), prob. juris. noted, 436 U.S. 924 (1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
14. 351 So. 2d at 904.
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not unconstitutional. 5 Relying on Kahn v. Shevin, '6 and endorsing
a similar statutory disposition in the Georgia Supreme Court's
Murphy v. Murphy," the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals noted
that "[i]t is the wife of a broken marriage who needs financial
assistance for whom the alimony statutes of Alabama were de-
signed."1 The Supreme Court of Alabama quashed Mr. Orr's peti-
tion for writ of certiorari. 9
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction",
and addressed three preliminary questions of a jurisdictional nature
which had not been previously raised. The Supreme Court found
that Mr. Orr had standing and that his challenge was not untimely.
Further, since the Alabama courts had not based their decisions on
the fact that Mr. Orr's alimony obligation was part of a stipulation
agreement between the parties, there were no independent and ade-
quate state grounds which could prevent the Supreme Court from
having the power to entertain the constitutional question pre-
sented.21
The Court held that the authorization to impose alimony obliga-
tions on husbands, but-not on wives, violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court reached its deter-
mination by reasoning that the classification by gender did not serve
any important governmental objectives and that the classification
was not substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives.22 The three possible governmental objectives that the statute
might have served were: (1) the announcement of Alabama's prefer-
ence that the wife play a dependent role in the family; (2) the use
of sex roles in determining the spouse's need; and (3) the compensa-
tion of women for the discrimination during their marriage which
supposedly left them financially dependent on their husbands. The
Court considered each objective individually and determined that
15. Id. at 905.
16. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). In Kahn, the Court held that a state tax law which granted
widows but not widowers an annual $500 property tax exemption "[was] not arbitrary
although it 'discriminate[s] in favor of a certain class . .. [because] the discrimination is
founded upon a reasonable distinction, or difference in the state policy.' "Id. at 355 (quoting
Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959)).
17. 206 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975). In Murphy, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that a Georgia divorce statute similar to the Alabama divorce statute
in Orr did not violate the fifth or fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution
or the relevant state constitutional provisions. Id. at 460.
18. 351 So. 2d at 905.
19. Id. at 906.
20. 436 U.S. 924 (1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
21. 99 S. Ct. at 1107-11 (1979).
22. Id. at 1111-14.
19791
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all three were without merit.1
Relying on Stanton v. Stanton,24 the Court noted that "[n]o
longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of
the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of
ideas." '25 Therefore, the governmental objective of allocating the
family responsibilities, under which the wife plays a dependent role,
could not sustain the statute. The Court decided that "even if sex
were a reliable proxy for need, and even if the institution of marriage
did discriminate against women, 2 6 these factors did not justify the
features of Alabama's statutory scheme because the Alabama stat-
utes provide for hearings to consider a party's financial condition
before an award of alimony is made. 27
The Court further held that the gender classification of the stat-
ute produced perverse results. Instead of granting alimony only to
the needy spouse, as would a gender neutral law, the Alabama
scheme would permit a financially independent wife to receive ali-
mony from the husband who may not be as financially well off as
she. The Court reasoned that the stereotypical role of women as
being dependent on men is perpetuated by legislative classifications
such as the Alabama alimony statute. Such legislative classifica-
tions produce results which are antithetical to the results which the
equal protection clause seeks to create, and thus must be held un-
constitutional.2
Although the Supreme Court held that the Alabama alimony
statutes were unconstitutional, the Alabama court on remand could
determine whether Mr. Orr must continue to pay alimony to Mrs.
Orr on some other grounds. 29 To provide a better understanding of
the significance of Orr this note will first examine some of the histor-
ical case law dealing with the allocation of alimony, and then some
of the most recent United States Supreme Court decisions dealing
with gender-based classifications. Finally, it will refocus on the ali-
mony issue through a discussion of relevant Florida law.
II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF AMERICAN CASE LAW DEALING WITH
ALIMONY ALLOCATION
Historically, in the absence of statutory authority, a husband
23. Id.
24. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
25. 99 S. Ct. at 1112 (quoting 421 U.S. at 14-15).
26. Id. at 1112-13.
27. Id. at 1113.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1114.
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could not be awarded permanent alimony from his wife. 0 The courts
usually rationalized this by recognizing the common law notion that
it was a husband's obligation and duty to support his wife.' How-
ever, some states deviated from this practice, explicitly providing
by statute for alimony awards to husbands.2 The general principles
which governed the determination of whether the wife was entitled
to alimony in a divorce case were also applied in determining
whether the husband would be granted an award from the wife's
estate in the form of alimony. 33 Furthermore, some courts concluded
that their legislatures intended to make alimony statutes equally
applicable to both parties, especially where all the property was in
the wife's name. 4
In the absence of statutes which provided alimony for husbands,
many courts were reluctant to award husbands alimony because
courts did not want to substitute their social and economic beliefs
for the judgment of legislative bodies.3 1 Yet, the Pennsylvania courts
did not hesitate to substitute their social and economic beliefs for
the judgment of their legislative body. Although the Pennsylvania
Legislature had passed an Equal Rights Amendment to its state
constitution, the divorce statute which provided alimony only for
women was not changed. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held the divorce statute to be unconstitutional in that it violated the
very premise upon which the Equal Rights Amendment rests. 31
One New York court has held that New York's alimony statute,
providing alimony for women but not for men, is unconstitutional
30. E.g., Davies v. Davies, 113 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (husband denied
alimony because of lack of statutory authority, even though his wife had caused him such
physical harm during their marriage that he was no longer able to earn a living); Laweing v.
Laweing, 21 S.W.2d 2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929) (husband had no right to alimony). See generdly
Annot., 66 A.L.R. 2d 880 (1959).
31. E.g., Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904) (arrears of alimony not discharged in
bankruptcy proceeding because law imposes a duty on a husband to support his wife and
children). See generally 24 AM. JuR. 2d Divorce & Separation § 524 (1966).
32. E.g., McLean v. McLean, 290 N.W. 913 (N.D. 1940) (wife has duty to support her
husband when he is unable to care for himself and the wife has the financial ability to do
so); Sharkey v. Sharkey, 137 N.E.2d 575 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955) (alimony award to husband
upheld where the wife had neglected her husband and had been cruel to him). See generally
24 Am. JUR. 2d Divorce & Separation § 527 n.17 (1966).
33. Topor v. Topor, 192 N.E. 52 (Mass. 1934) (wife was ordered to convey her interest in
two parcels of land to her husband where the court considered needs and abilities of the
parties).
34. E.g., Barnett v. Barnett, 13 P.2d 104 (Okla. 1932) (granting husband a reasonable
portion of wife's separate property upon divorce, to provide a means of support for him and
their minor children).
35. E.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 206 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. 1974) (holding that Georgia statute
allowing only wife alimony was constitutional, and that any change must come from the state
legislature, not the courts).
36. Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1974).
1979]
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because there is no rational basis for the distinction and because no
compelling state interest requires that men categorically be denied
alimony. 3 The New York court reasoned that in order to sustain a
rational basis, a legislature could not make categorical assumptions
in a statute which would indicate arbitrary value judgments of
male-female roles.3 Additionally, this court reasoned that through
the use of statutory distinctions based on sex, economic discrimina-
tion between men and women may actually increase.39
As a result of changing social attitudes concerning equality of the
sexes, conflicting views appeared in cases dealing with alimony.
Thus, the Supreme Court in Orr found it necessary to address the
issue of alimony and the equality of the sexes. However, this issue
could only be resolved after the Court arrived at an equal protection
analysis for gender-based classifications.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF EQUAL PROTECTION
CHALLENGES TO GENDER-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS IN THE 1970's
Gender-based classifications have been constitutionally chal-
lenged in the United States Supreme Court for over a century. Prior
to 1971, the Court consistently found that there was no denial of
equal protection where a statute set forth gender-based classifica-
tions. During the 1970's, although some gender-based classifications
were upheld, others were invalidated by the Court.40 Because the
Court has failed to adopt a single equal protection analysis for all
constitutional challenges to gender-based classifications, Orr is a
significant decision. It is essential to analyze some of the recent
United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with equal protec-
tion and gender-based classifications to better understand the
Court's rationale in Orr and its intended scope.
Reed v. Reed4 was the first case in which the Court found state
37. Thaler v. Thaler, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331, 335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 396
N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1977) (holding that alimony should not have been granted to the
husband in this case and declining to discuss the constitutionality of New York's divorce
statute); cf. Stern v. Stern, 332 A.2d 78, 83 (Conn. 1973) (holding that the Connecticut statute
allowing alimony only for women does not violate the equal protection clause, as the husband
failed to prove that the statute was unreasonable or arbitrary).
38. Thaler v. Thaler, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331, 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 396
N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1977).
39. 391 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
40. Gender-based classifications were upheld in Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Gender-
based classifications were invalidated in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
41. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
ALIMONY FOR MEN
law using gender-based classifications to be violative of the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause. In Reed, the Court
analyzed a mandatory provision of the Idaho Probate Code giving
preference to men over similarly situated women for appointment
as administrator of a decedent's estate. Administrative convenience
for the probate courts was the only state interest put forth in sup-
port of the provision. The Court noted that "[a] classification
'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest .upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.' "42 Further, the Court observed that by giving a man-
datory preference to members of one sex over the other, just to avoid
a hearing on the merits, the legislature was using an arbitrary choice
that was forbidden by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment . 3
Two years later the Court decided Frontiero v. Richardson," in-
volving a statutory scheme which provided that wives of uniformed
servicemen were presumed dependents, for purposes of servicemen
obtaining increased benefits and allowances. To become eligible for
the same benefits and allowances, a uniformed servicewoman had
to prove that her husband was dependent on her. The Court held
that such a distinction based solely on administrative convenience
could not be upheld because it violated the due process clause of the
fifth amendment . 5 Although Frontiero appeared to bring gender-
based classifications under the compelling interest test of equal pro-
tection, Frontiero had a limited effect because a plurality of the
Court declined to characterize sex as a suspect class. 41
After Frontiero, the United States Supreme Court, in Kahn v.
Shevin 7 upheld a Florida statute granting an annual $500 property
tax exemption to widows, but not to widowers. The Court found the
classification "widow" valid because it furthered the legitimate
state purpose "of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss
upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy
burden.' ' 48 In analyzing this gender-based statutory scheme, the
Kahn Court did not find itself bound by Frontiero's use of the com-
pelling interest test. Rather, it became apparent that gender-based
42. Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
43. 404 U.S. at 76.
44. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
45. Id. at 690-91.
46. The plurality consisted of Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Black-
mun. See 411 U.S. at 691.
47. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
48. Id. at 355.
1979]
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classifications created for a remedial effect would be subject to less
stringent scrutiny than other gender-based classifications."
The United States Supreme Court applied a minimal scrutiny
test similar to that used in Kahn in Schlesinger v. Ballard.50 The
Ballard Court upheld the different statutory classification and
treatment for promotions of male and female naval officers because
restrictions imposed on women's participation in combat and sea
duties did not afford them the same opportunities for career ad-
vancement as the male line officers. The Court distinguished
Ballard from Frontiero and Reed in that the schemes in Frontiero
and Reed were based solely upon administrative convenience.', Fur-
ther, in both Reed and Frontiero, the challenged sex classifications
were premised on stereotypical generalizations. In Reed, the under-
lying assumption of the statutory scheme was that men made better
estate administrators than similarly situated women. In Frontiero,
the underlying assumption of the statutory scheme was that females
are normally dependent upon their husbands. In Ballard, however,
the female and male officers were not similarly situated because
female officers were restricted from participating in combat and sea
duty, while male officers were not so restricted. Further, the statu-
tory scheme in Ballard provided for promotions which served the
Navy's needs.52
After Ballard, the United States Supreme Court indicated that it
would look to the statute's objectives in determining whether its
gender distinctions violated equal protection in Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld. 5 The Court invalidated a provision of the Social Secu-
rity Act which granted benefits to the widow and the couple's chil-
dren based on the earnings of their deceased husband and father but
did not provide for similar benefits being granted to a widower. The
Court reasoned that such a provision was based on the assumption
that a male worker's earnings constitute a more significant contri-
bution to a family's support than do a female worker's earnings. 4
Since the purpose was not premised upon any special disadvantage
peculiar to women, it could not justify a gender-based distinction. 5
Similarly, in Stanton v. Stanton,56 the United States Supreme
49. See generally Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (upholding California's disability
insurance statute that excluded expenses for normal pregnancy and childbirth).
50. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
51. Id. at 505-08.
52. Id. at 506-08.
53. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
54. Id. at 643.
55. Id. at 648.
56. 421 U.S. 7 (1975). (The appellee in Stanton had been ordered to make monthly
support payments for his children. When the appellee's daughter obtained the age of eight-
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Court invalidated a state statute which set the age of majority at
twenty-one for males and at eighteen for females. The Court held
that this statutory provision in the context of child support violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because
there was no rational basis for the sex-based age classification.
The United States Supreme Court finally succeeded in defining
an appropriate standard to determine whether a gender classifica-
tion statute would be upheld in Craig v. Boren." The standard, the
so-called "substantial relationship test," announced in Craig re-
quires that a gender-based classification serve important govern-
mental objectives and be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives in order to pass constitutional scrutiny." The
Court applied this standard in holding unconstitutional an Okla-
homa statute which prohibited the sale of alcohol to males under
the age of twenty-one and to females under the age of eighteen.
In two subsequent cases dealing with gender-based classifica-
tions, Califano v. Goldfarb,9 and Califano v. Webster,"0 the United
States Supreme Court utilized the Craig standard. The Court in
Goldfarb held unconstitutional a gender-based distinction between
widows and widowers for survivors' benefits under the Social Secu-
rity Act. Under the Act, a widower received benefits only if he had
received at least half of his support from his wife, whereas the widow
received benefits regardless of her degree of dependency on her hus-
band. In contrast, the Court in Webster upheld the sex distinction
used in section 215 of the Social Security Act' to compute old age
benefits, which resulted in slightly higher benefits for a retired fe-
male wage earner than for a similarly situated retired male wage
earner. The Court reasoned that the statutory scheme in Webster
was not violative of the due process clause because it served the
important governmental objective of reducing economic disparities
between men and women caused by sex-based discrimination.2
The Orr Court utilized the "substantially related" test set forth
in Webster and Craig to invalidate the Alabama statutory scheme.
It is interesting to observe that the Court could have followed Kahn
and held that the reason for granting alimony to women and not
men could help cure the disparity between the economic capabili-
een, appellee discontinued the support payments.)
57. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
58. Id.
59. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
60. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
61. Act of Aug. 28, 1950, Pub. L. No. 734, 64 Stat. 506 (1950) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 415 (1970)).
62. 430 U.S. at 320.
1979]
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ties of a man and a woman. 3 In addition, the Orr Court could have
made a pertinent analogy to Kahn: the plight of a divorcee may be
similar to that of a widow in that a wife who is dependent on her
husband's support is thrown into the same job market regardless of
whether the woman is a widow or divorcee. As a result of Orr, a more
definitive test can now be utilized by the Court in determining the
constitutionality of a gender-based statute.
IV. FLORIDA CASE LAW PERTAINING TO ALIMONY
Florida case law pertaining to alimony developed in harmony
with the case law in other jurisdictions." In Florida, alimony was
also considered a common law obligation of a husband to support
his wife. 5 When determining what alimony was to be awarded to the
wife, Florida courts generally looked at the wife's needs and the
husband's ability to pay."
In 1971, Florida adopted no-fault divorce which provided for a
means of dissolution of marriage without either party having to
allege or prove fault on the part of the other. 7 More importantly,
for the first time, a husband was furnished with a statutory basis
which enabled him to seek and obtain an alimony award from his
wife. 8 Regardless which spouse is granted alimony, the basic nature
and purpose of the award remains the same. 9 Thus, as a result of
the no-fault divorce and the statutory basis for an alimony award
to either spouse, both parties to the marriage share equal rights and
obligations in the marriage relationship as well as the burdens ih the
event of a dissolution."
63. Economic capabilities include a spouse's earning capacity as well as any capital he
or she may have as a result of a gift or inheritance.
64. See Gill v. Gill, 145 So. 758 (Fla. 1933) (the court reasoned that a husband will be
required to support his wife if, during their marriage, he has impaired her ability to earn a
living); Thompson v. Thompson, 98 So. 589 (Fla. 1923) (the court noted that under the then
current Florida statutes, the wife could get maintenance from her husband only if the live-
apart arrangement is not her fault); Phinney v. Phinney, 82 So. 357 (Fla. 1919) (under the
then current Florida statutes the wife could not be awarded permanent alimony when the
husband brought suit for divorce and when the divorce was granted due to the fault of the
wife).
65. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 50 So. 2d 169, 173 (Fla. 1951).
66. See generally Jacobs v. Jacobs, 50 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1951); Chaires v. Chaires, 10 Fla.
308 (Fla. 1864); Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
67. Ch. 71-241, 1971 Fla. Laws 1319 (current version at FLA. STAT. ch. 61 (Supp. 1978)).
68. FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (Supp. 1978); see Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1972).
69. See, e.g., Ross v. Ross, 341 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 354 So.
2d 984 (1977) (alimony is for the support of a former marriage partner); Dash v. Dash, 284
So. 2d 407 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (alimony provides nourishment and the necessities
of life to a former spouse).
70. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583, 585 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
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Today, Florida is one of thirty-four states which makes the right
to alimony or separate maintenance explicitly sex neutral.7' Section
61.08, Florida Statutes, provides: "(1) In a proceeding for dissolu-
tion of marriage, the court may grant alimony to either party
. . "72 Until this statute was amended in 1978, the statute did not
provide any particular guidelines or criteria for determining a pro-
per award of alimony. Therefore, many courts considered such di-
verse factors as: the length of the marriage; the number of children;
the relative health and physical condition of the parties; the extent
of the wife's contribution to her husband's career; the conduct or
misconduct of the parties during their marriage; and finally any
change in either spouse's financial condition.7 3
The Florida Legislature amended section 61.08 of the Florida
Statutes in 1978 to include certain guidelines which the courts could
utilize in determining an award of alimony.74 In addition to consid-
ering any factor necessary to render justice between the parties,
Florida courts can consider the standard of living established during
the marriage, the length of the marriage, the age and condition of
both parties, each party's financial resources, the necessary time
required for either party to obtain education or training for employ-
ment purposes, and each party's contribution to the marriage.7 5
Although Florida's alimony statute is sex neutral, the courts con-
tinue to evaluate the husband's ability to pay and the wife's needs
to determine how much, if any, alimony should be awarded." There
are only three reported cases since 1970 in which the Florida courts
have awarded alimony to the husband.77 Temporary relief was
71. 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001 (Nov. 1, 1977).
72. (Supp. 1978).
73. E.g., McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Gordon
v. Gordon, 335 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
When the wife is seeking alimony, the courts not only determine the husband's ability to
pay by his income but they also consider the husband's capital assets and the standard 'of
living shared by the parties. Sisson v. Sisson, 336 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1976) (where the court,
quoting Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1972), stated that consideration should
also be given to the husband's capital assets); Kast v. Kast, 351 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 4th Diist.
Ct. App. 1977) (where the court in considering the husband's ability to pay and the needs of'
the wife also looked at the wife's standard of living during the marriage); Hausman v. Haus-
man, 330 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
74. Ch. 78-339, 1978 Fla. Laws 944 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (Supp. 1978)).
75. FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (Supp. 1978).
76. Many courts still consider that if the husband has the ability, he should provide his
divorced wife with her needs. See, e.g., George v. George, 360 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977); Storer v. Storer, 353 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Kast v. Kast, 351
So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Caracristi v. Caracristi, 324 So. 2d 634 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
77. Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Wynne v. Wynne, 342
So. 2d 556 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Yohem v. Yohem, 295 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1974). Two additional cases granting alimony to the husband which were reversed in
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awarded to the husband in Yohem v. Yohem,75 where the district
court noted that under the new dissolution of marriage law, either
spouse has an equal right to seek alimony or support. In Yohem, the
husband was granted $17,000 from the wife's savings account be-
cause the wife was in a better financial condition to pay than was
the husband.
Permanent alimony was awarded to the husband in Wynne v.
Wynne. 79 The district court held that such an award was not an
abuse of discretion. A lump-sum alimony award and a rehabilitative
alimony award to the husband was upheld in Pfohl v. Pfohl. 0 The
Pfohl court noted that during the majority of the Pfohl's nine-year
marriage, Mrs. Pfohl had been the sole supporter of her husband
and family. Further, it was at Mrs. Pfohl's insistence that her hus-
band had terminated his employment, after a year and one-half of
marriage, so that he could devote more time and attention to his
family.8' The court observed that the question of alimony usually
arises in a nontraditional type marriage, where the wife is the sole
supporter of the family. Therefore, the Pfohl court considered the
high standard of living to which the husband had become accus-
tomed as well as the husband's need for alimony coupled with the
apparent ability of the wife to so provide.82
Although the Florida statute allowing either spouse to be granted
alimony is a radical departure from the common law obligation of
the husband to support his wife, the Florida alimony statute is in
harmony with the changing views of our society and of the law.
Thus, the Florida courts are now striving to enforce sexual equality
of the spouses in marriage and its subsequent dissolution. Unless a
spouse lacks the capacity to be self-supporting, Florida courts are
hesitant to award that spouse alimony. 3
district courts of appeal are Palmer v. Palmer, 330 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
and Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972). Palmer recognizes that
alimony cannot be granted to both spouses. Lefler recognizes that the purpose of alimony
remains the same regardless which spouse is granted alimony.
78. 295 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
79. 342 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
80. 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Lump sum alimony is a payment of a
definite sum and is usually in the nature of a property settlement. Rehabilitative alimony is
a payment which enables a spouse to seek education or training so that that particular spouse
can become self-supporting. Id. at 378.
81. 345 So. 2d at 377.
82. Id. at 376.
83. See generally George v. George, 360 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(where both the husband and wife earned approximately the same annual salary the court
considered the present needs of the wife and the ability of the husband to meet those needs
and determined that the evidence did not support the wife's present need for the amount of
alimony allowed); Spotts v. Spotts, 355 So. 2d 228, 229-30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
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V. CONCLUSION
As of 1977, thirty-four states had provisions which enabled either
spouse the right to be granted alimony awards. In contrast, fifteen
other states had provisions which enabled only the wife the right to
receive alimony.8' As a result of the recent Supreme Court opinion
rendered in Orr, it is anticipated that these states will invalidate
their alimony statutes and provide that either spouse may be
awarded alimony. These states will no longer be able to sustain
statutes which grant only women alimony on the ground that it is
the state's preference for wives to be dependent on their husbands
in the allocation of family responsibilities. Furthermore, a state will
not be able to claim that it is assisting needy spouses by using sex
as a proxy for need, nor can it justify the statute on the ground that
it removes the economic disparity between men and women."
Another alternative that these fifteen states may consider is
deleting awards of alimony altogether. Yet, this alternative is not
likely to be chosen. Alimony usually includes payment of support
to the custodial parent who has the child-bearing responsibilities
and is unable to realize a full earning capacity. In addition, the
paying spouse receives a tax advantage in that alimony is a tax
deduction."
The concept of alimony has drastically changed from the histori-
cal view that alimony was the common law obligation of the hus-
band to support his wife. Until recent years, a divorced wife had
little prospect of working to support herself. However, with the ad-
vent of equal opportunities, many women have been able to acquire
higher paying jobs or advanced educational opportunities. As these
opportunities for women near a level of equality with their male
counterparts, women will have the ability to be self-supporting. To
this extent there is less need for wives to receive alimony payments
from their husbands. In addition, as a result of Orr, we will see a
balance struck between cases where the obligor is a wife and in cases
where the obligor is a husband.
Although courts and legislatures have been slow to respond to
changing social attitudes, the law is now taking a more realistic view
(court considered present financial condition of both parties in determining that the lower
court had abused its discretion by awarding the wife an unusually high amount in lump-sum
alimony); Bateman v. Bateman, 301 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (in light of the
wife's health and earning capacity, it was not error for the trial court to deny the wife per-
manent alimony).
84. 4 FAM. L. REp. (BNA) 3001 (Nov. 1, 1977).
85. 99 S. Ct. at 1102 (1979).
86. I.R.C. § 215(a). The importance of this tax deduction depends on the tax bracket of
the paying spouse, as well as the amount -of the alimony.
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in considering that women and men are equal partners in the mar-
riage and in the event of dissolution, both should share the responsi-
bilities and the burdens. Orr, as well as the changing social attitudes
of our country, provide an environment conducive to a revolution in
and a readjustment of our alimony and divorce laws.
